Equality and the mentally retarded. by Ritchie, Robert W.
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014
1974
Equality and the mentally retarded.
Robert W. Ritchie
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses
This thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses 1911 -
February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Ritchie, Robert W., "Equality and the mentally retarded." (1974). Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014. 2492.
Retrieved from https://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses/2492

EQUALITY AND THE MENTALLY RETARDED
A Thesis Presented
By
Robert W. Ritchie
Submitted tc the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degre
MASTER OF ARTS
September
Philosophy
1974
EQUALITY AND THE MENTALLY RETARDED
A Thesis for Master's Degree
By
Robert W. Ritchie
Approved as to style and content by:
Thomas R. Yearns Member
SLlu c, OL .-1.—^ v V ^ ^ 1 r vv
Vere C. Chappell, Member
Vere C. Chappell, Department
Head, Philosophy Department
August 1974
CONTENTS
Section I . .
Section II
Section III
.
Section IV
Section V . .
Section VI
Notes . . . .
Appendix A
Appendix B
Appendix C
Appendix D
Bibliography
Page 1
Page 5
Page 16
Page 35
Page 50
Page 72
Page 88
Page 93
Page 95
Page 98
Page 100
Page 101
Equality and the Mentally Retarded
I
Death or banishment would very positively have allev-
iated the difficulties encountered by society in its dealings
with those persons born into that society with what it
describes under the heading mental defects or mental defic-
iencies. But in deference to society's sensitivity to
the obvious injustice associated with such radical remedies
and the guilt that would inevitably become its legacy,
society has opted for a more comfortable alternative in our
public facilities for the mentally ill and the mentally
retarded
.
There had always been a most satisfying simplicity
in this approach, which sense of satisfaction was seldom
assailed by criticism from those most directly affected.
The famed English facility of Bedlam, moreover, stood ever
2available as the ultimate evil of its type against which
our own facilities could reliably be compared with favor.
Recently
,
however, public attention has been directed
to our facilities; and what had previously been a toler-
ably comfortable abstraction gradually transformed into
the depressing reality we have come to know as Willowbrook,
or Belchertown State School, or other such facility in
all its concrete ugliness. It was at last being made
clear that rather than being comfortable retreats for
those not equal to the demands of life in conventional
society, these places were in fact nothing but dismal
warehouses for society's rejects. Even those in govern-
ment, finding themselves in positions of authority in
such facilities, came to realize increasingly that the
only apt adjective for prevailing conditions is 'inhuman.'
The Director of New York's Willowbrook State School com-
pared the treatment accorded the mentally retarded at his
facility with the treatment traditionally reserved for
criminals: "We're treating the mentally retarded as if
they have somehow offended society."^-
The implementation of alternatives to the present
typical institutional arrangement gives rise to enormous
difficulties, not the least of which is a large, reliable
and continuing appropriation of public funds together with
responsible patterns and machinery for its distribution.
3The more offensive elements of life in the institution
are gradually undergoing change for the better. This is
not, it seems, the result of a radical shift in philoso-
phical priorities, but rather a belated reaction to growing
public pressure. A more selective screening of institu-
tional populations is being undertaken such that in time
orily those really in need of this kind of structured
environment will be institutionalized, while those capable
of living in and benefiting (and benefiting from) normal
social environments will be required to do so. So long,
however, as society produces and counts among its number
persons mentally defective or deficient, such institutions
will and must continue to exist.
It is probable that those conditions will abate which
have characterized our facilities as (in the words of one
Massachusetts state official) "snake pits." Nevertheless,
it is a matter of first importance to lay the proper
foundation for the future structure and role of the
institution. The institution's reduced population as well
as those discharged from the institution must effectively
be guaranteed the equal protection of the lav/s of our
state and federal governments, and must be rendered justice
no less than that rendered to the rest of us.
The scope of our present inquiry is both legal and
philosophical in nature, dealing as it does with the notion
4of equality, with particular emphasis on how that notion
is judicially construed within the context of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution and the constitutions of the
states, and on how that notion so construed relates to
the class of mentally retarded persons. I propose to
survey the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
that most directly relate to that class, more specifically
the Massachusetts Mental Health Act, for the purpose of
showing a particular respect in which that statute (which
by and large is a model of enlightened legislation of its
type) is nevertheless deficient; specifically in its
failure to contain a provision for independent supervision
of its full and even-handed administration. This arguably
could be achieved by the establishment of autonomous legal
counsel and advisory services outside the framework of the
Massachusetts Department of Mental Health or other state
agency
.
I further propose against the background of operative
state law to survey judicial decisions construing the equal
p iDtection clause with an eye to abstracting therefrom
the judicially recognized ingredients of the concept of
equality as they might be appropriate for any consider-
ation of the mentally retarded as a class.
I shall discuss certain writings of Ch. Perelman and
5of Bernard Williams on the subject of equality in an
attempt to support my conclusion that legislation essentially
similar to House Bill No. 2690 of the 1972 Massachusetts
Legislature ought to be enacted into law establishing an
autonomous watchdog agency or office, substantially
improving the liklihood that justice will not be denied
to the mentally retarded through the arbitrary adminis-
tration of otherwise good laws. (House Bill No. 2690
appears as Appendix A. Appendix B incorporates Chapter
893 of the Acts of the 1973 Massachusetts Legislature,
limitedly providing legal assistance to the indigent
mentally ill.)
II
But what are the conditions that prevail at such
places as the Belchertown State School (which by public
report appear not so loathsome as many other facilities
both in and out of Massachusetts) which prompt us to
allege that the residents of these facilities have been
effectively denied justice and the equal protection of
the laws? An exhaustive ansv/er to that question would
inevitably result in a disproportionate allocation of
space, and I shall accordingly give an overview of
conditions based in part upon long, direct, personal
6observation, in part on the continuing investigations
made by an organization of friends and families of the
residents, and in part on the reports of public commissions
set up for the purpose of investigation of facility con-
ditions
.
Recently these efforts prompted a class action suit
to be brought in the Federal District Court for the District
of Massachusetts, which suit named the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts and a number of individuals in or connected
with the Department of Mental Health as defendants. The
suit made claims founded upon the deprivation of rights,
privileges and immunities secured to facility residents
by the first, fifth and fourteenth amendments, and the
imposition of cruel, unusual and unlawful conditions
which were alleged to be in derogation of the rights
secured by the eighth amendment. It was also claimed
that the residents we re denied the equal protection of
the laws secured by the fourteenth amendment.
This litigation recently terminated in a consent
decree, leaving to implication rather than to judicial
finding that there had in fact been a violation of any
of the above mentioned rights of residents. While a
most desirable result from the point of view of the
immediate concerns of the petitioning class and further
as an indicator of more enlightened administration in
7days to come, nevertheless we are not given the benefit
of an exhaustive judicial analysis (or complete record
for appeal to higher courts) which might otherwise have
become a persuasive precedent for future citation.
Compromise and settlement have traditionally character-
ized consitutional controversy, with notable exception
currently evident in the United States House of Repre-
sentatives. The adoption of consent decrees tends to
achieve immediate objectives without however setting
bounds to the scope of future judicial resolutions.
On the occasion of the entry of the consent decree
in the case referred to, U. S. District Court Judge Joseph
L. Tauro acknowledged this point:
I have been to Belchertown. I know that there is
a great deal that needs to be done there. I recog-
nize that this is not the end of the line for
Belchertown, and I'm very, very satisfied that
the responsible public officials recognize that
Belchertown, as all other institutions, has to
be under a constant state of review ; but I do
think that what we have been able to accomplish
here is to give some immediate relief to people
who absolutely can't help themselves. I think
that we have reached down to help those who are
3
helpless in the truest sense of the word." (emphasis
added)
The court pleadings in that case include allegations
that "the conditions in which the plaintiffs and the
class they represent live are so shockingly oppresive,
unsanitary, unhealthy and degrading that they are an
affront to basic human decency and a violation of funda-
mental constitutional rights." 4
In 1964, a special commission was established by
the Massachusetts legislature to investigate and study
the training facilities for retarded children. Their
report appears as 1964 House Bill 3061 in which it was
stated (and restated again in the pleadings in this case)
that the State School at Belchertown was characterized
by "isolated geographic location
. . . drab atmosphere.
.
a past, present and future state of inertia and somnolence
. . . obsolete patient dormitory buildinas requiring very
extensive modernization
. . . the problem of ventilation i
. .
5
critical . " This report continued to point out that there
was a serious overcrowding condition there resulting in
residents being "forced to live in situations far below
(the) minimum standards" established by the Massachusetts
Department of Public Health. The report cited "the com-
plete inadequacy of the basic medical care and supervision
of . . . residents . . . flagrant lack of social service
workers, psychologists and psychiatric personnel . . .
desperate need for doctors, nurses, licensed practical
9nurses . . . conspicuous neglect in the provision of
attendants and therapists ... a manifest shortage of
teaching personnel and rehabilitation specialists
. . .
totally inadequate educational rehabilitation programs
. . . marked limitations in services (education) " as
instances of the conditions that were brought to light
as a result of the investigation of the state schools.
These uncontradicted revelations were the prelude
to four years of uninterupted inattention by the state
to conditions it could in no administrative or legal
way (short of class litigation) be compelled to rectify.
In 1968 The American Association on Mental Defici-
ency (Division of Special Studies, Institutional Eval-
uation Project, Final Evaluation for Belchertown State
School, May, 1968, Appendix A) issued a report (portions
of which were reprinted in the pleadings of the class
action suit) which included the following:
The major weakness in the management is a marked
shortage of qualified professional and ward per-
sonnel . . . the institution is still seriously
overcrowded . . . limited staff precludes a com-
prehensive diagnostic evaluation prior to admission
and sometimes immediately following admission . .
.
training and staff development are major goals
of the institution; but limited activity is pre-
sent . . . apparently there are no regularly sched-
uled interdisciplinary conferences for supervisory
10
personnel of all departments
. . . therefore, over-
all communi cation is somewhat limited
. . . inability
to recruit an assistant executive officer prevents
the Superintendent frcm more active participation
in the program of the institution
. . . absence
of an open door policy
. . . medical service is
handicapped by the shortage of medical personnel
. . .
the hospital is not accredited by the Joint
Commission on Hospital Accreditation
. . . because
of a shortage of personnel, the institution depends
on the services of residents for productive service
. . .
the insufficient number of attendant personnel
makes it difficult to take care of the needs of
the residents and almost eliminates time for ade-
quate housekeeping.
The sleeping areas reflect the serious overcrowding,
and the toilet and bathing areas do not offer any
privacy . . . most of the buildings are overcrowded
with limited bathing and lavatory facilities . . .
there are no adequate facilities for the storage of
janitorial equipment or for clean and soiled
laundry in the residential buildings . . . there is
no adequate indoor play area or adequate space ror
staff, equipment, and counselling in the living
11
units
. . . all the outdoor recreation areas
are fenced in and rather meagerly furnished with
equipment
. . . there appears to be quite limited
freedom of movement of residents about the insti-
tution grounds
. . . all buildings are locked
and most of the recreation areas attached to the
buildings are enclosed in high metal fences
. . .
in general, the attitude towards the residents
appears to be primarily that of benevolence with
rigid rules and very limited regard for the dig-
nity and potential self-reliance of the individual.
The pleadings state that the then Assistanct Commissioner
of the Department of Mental Health for Mental Retardation,
on January 14, 1969, visited the facility and in a written
report cited his impressions of nudity, lack of sanitation,
poor ventilation, overcrowdedness, restraint, assaults,
improper use of discipline, lack of safety and privacy,
roaches, staff shortages, and homosexuality.
In 1970, a Special Legislative Commission on Training
Facilities Available for Handicapped Children restated
the general criticisms of the facility and pointed out that
"differences among institutions, and even within institutions,
highlight glaring inequities in treatment for certain indiv-
iduals and raises the question of the unfair distribution
g
of the Commonwealth Treasury." It pointed out that the
12
the greatest inequity "was demonstrated by prevailing
conditions for the large number of residents who are in
so-called 'back wards.' . . . Back wards are character-
ized by
. . . repression of individual freedom and
personal development through the excessive use of locks
and heavy metal doors and by the enormity of buildings
and numbers of patients assigned to dormitories . . .
day rooms or recreation rooms (are) characterized by over-
powering odor. Patients often appear nude or dressed
in institutional garb. There is a lack of programs and
a lack of purposeful activity, communication or any inter-
7
action .
"
The Legislature in 1971 received a report from the
Joint Special Commission on Belchertown State School and
Monson State Hospital which stated:
Belchertown is nearly a total failure and needs
immediate and direct attention. ... At Belchertown
the buildings are old, crowded, sparsely furnished and
frequently cold. Repairs at times go unattended for
months. On occasion, the fire alarm system has been
inoperative. Within the past three months, raw
sewerage has backed up and overflown portions of rhe
Infirmary. . . . Doors to residential buildings often
cannot be opened due to the age of the locking system.
. . .
At Belchertown there are continuing unnecessary
shortages of sanitation supplies, such as disin-
fectant, detergents and mops, directly resulting in
the daily spread of infection among the residents.
. .
Dysentery has been recurrent the last several years,
boils and diarrhea occur on a daily basis. Rashes
are not uncommon.
. . . Staff members have found it
necessary to purchase from their own funds such items
as disinfectant, detergent, soap, tooth paste, flash-
lights, deodorant, scissors, shampoo, buttons and
thread. . . . There has been no overall professional
inspection and evaluation of Belchertown in over a
year. . . . The medical laboratory at Belchertown
causes delay in needed patient care. ... In some
buildings at Belchertown excrement and urine are
constantly visible and unattended. ... In the past
there has been insufficient clothing for the resi-
dents resulting in prolonged nakedness and degra-
dation. . . . Cockroaches have been chronic, ever
present and in the recent past, have overrun several
buildings to the extent of crawling over immobile
patients. . . . Parts of the living quarters at
Belchertown are in violation of the State Sanitorv
Code. Because of lack of screens, flies have in-
fested several buildings to the extent that fly
larvae (maggots) have been found nested in a sore on
a resident s ear.
. . . As to food, until recently,
the entire meal was served to many residents mixed
in a single metal bowl. ... There is no semblance
of privacy at Belchertown.
. . . Psychiatric and
psychological treatment is practically non-existent.
• • • Punishment has bordered on cruel and abusive
treatment. Discipline has been unevenly administered
with little relationship to the gravity of the offense
. . . Until recently, Belchertown had the highest
reported incidence of physical and chemical restraint
of any state school.
. . . Unnecessary and incorrect
medication has been given to residents.
. . . There
is no aggressive recruitment program for professionals
The education, vocational education and recreation
staffs are insufficient and cannot provide realistic
services for the school pupulation. . . . Due to
negativism by administration officials, the volunteer
v
program has failed to attract available student
participation from surrounding colleges. . . .
Prescribed medical care is delayed or ignored for
long periods of time. There are frequent shortages
of medical supplies and drugs. In many cases,
recommended corrective orthopedic surgery, as well as
the fitting of eyeglasses and hearing aids has been
delayed for several years. These delays further
15
reduced the resident's ability to function and in
some cases delayed discharge from the institution
for years .... Appropriated funds for furnishing
an addition to the administration building were
allowed to laose delaying the use of the building
by twenty-one months.
. . . Due to lack of screening,
residents have fallen 15 to 20 feet over second
story railings to the ground.
. . . Because of the
lack of initiative, Belchertown State School
has failed to fully utilize available Federal funds.
. . . The cn-ground hospital, responsible for the
provision of much of the medical services received
by the 1200 residents, is not accredited by the
national certification agency, the Joint Commission
g
on Hospital Accreditation.
The conditions reported above are not reflective currently
prevailing conditions, for very strenuous ameliorative
policies have been mandated by the Federal District Court
in the class action suit. These, to some degree, are
being achieved. To the degree that they are not, continuing
class action litigation remains the sole remedy of per-
sons concerned for the welfare of the retarded residents
of the facility. This is prohibitively expensive, slow,
and in general a far cry from that adequate watchdog ma-
chinery, which constitutional law and justice requires.
16
Moreover
,
without such machinery, the welfare of the
residents is made to be contingent upon the continuing
concern and activity of a few interested members of society,
and upon the continuing benevolence and competance of
state administrators.
An examination of the operative law in this state will
clearly reveal that the power of the Commissioner of the
Department of Mental Health is truly plenary; and the
above description of conditions reveals how plenary powers
have traditionally been exercised at Belchertown.
With regard to the continuing concern of non-official
non-residents, while it is gratifying to see how much
can be achieved by properly applied and very public
pressure, there is no warranted confidence that other
concerns and interests will not, as in the past, preempt
concern for the retarded.
Other provisions must be made.
Ill
That branch of our state government charged with
responsibility for those of its citizens characterized
as mentally retarded is the Department of Mental Health.
The Department is a creature of statute, by legislation
incorporated into the General Laws of the Commonwealth in
17
G. L. Chapter 19, which contains 30 sections. From the
introductory section (Sec. 1) we are given the following:
The Department shall take cognizance of all matters
affecting the mental health of the citizens of the
commonwealth and the welfare of the mentally re-
tarded. ... The Department shall have supervision
and control of all public facilities for mentally
ill or mentally retarded persons and of all persons
received into any of said facilities and shall have
general supervision of all private facilities for
such persons.
. . . The Department shall have super-
vision and control of all hospital, state schools,
.
. . and other mental health facilities.
Sections 16 and 21 embody 1966 legislation creating a
mental health advisory council consisting of thirty persons,
and a twenty-one member community mental health and retar-
dation area board for each of the departmental regions of
the state extablished pursuant to Section 18.
The council is made up of gubanatorial appointees
who serve without compensation, is composed of a mixture
of area board members and members of designated socially
oriented professions, and whose function, suggested by
its name, is to "advise . . . participate with the depart-
ment ... to obtain the views ... to review annual plans
. . .
make recommendations" and in short to be and function
18
as executive adjunct of the commissioner of the department
and to have power solely by his grace. (Appendix C incor-
porates G. L. Chapter 19, Section 16)
Similarly, the area boards are constituted with speci-
fied professional heterogeneity of its members who also
serve without compensation and "shall be an agency of the
commonwealth, and shall serve in the department." Appendix
D incorporates G. L. Chapter 19, Section 21) None of its
members may be employees of the department. Selection of
area board members is, notwithstanding advisory contribu-
tions of others, strictly the act of the commissioner
of the department. The duties and powers of the area
board (detailed in Section 23) no more effectively constrain,
nor are its decisions and recommendations more binding
upon, the commissioner than in the case of the council.
The commissioner remains the ultimate and sole repository
of all the power and authority legislatively conferred by
Chapter 19
.
The commissioner of the department is appointed by
the governor and must be a psychiatrist. He "shall have
had substantial administrative experience in mental health
facilities or agencies. . . . (and) may appoint and . . .
remove such agents and subordinate officers as he may
deem necessary, and may establish such divisions in the
department as he deems appropriate from time to time.
19
(Section 5)
Section 9 authorizes the commissioner to appoint full
time legal counsel "to serve as legal counsel to the
commissioner.
"
In addition to the commissioner and the assistant
commissioner for mental retardation. Section 19 also
establishes the position of regional administrator for
mental retardation, who is charged with performing such
duties as law and the commissioner may assign. His juris-
diction is limited to one of the six regions set up on the
basis of geographic and demographic factors.
Section 12 sets up an advisory council for "the planning,
construction, operation or utilization of facilities for the
mentally retarded, ..." the commissioner being a member
ex officio. The advisory council is charged with con-
sulting and advising the department relative to community
needs for such facilities and to the development of pro-
grams for their realization.
Section 14 states that at state schools for the men-
tally retarded the facility 11 shall establish and maintain,
subject to appropriation, research and demonstration pro-
jects in vocational rehabilitation in cooperation with the
federal vocation rehabilitation program." (emphasis added)
The commissioner and subordinate departmental officials
have no authority to disregard this legislative mandate.
and all investiqa-other than failure of appropriation;
tions to date indicate that no such program has been imple-
mented at Belchertown.
The Attorney General of Massachusetts, in a published
opinion dated March 10, 1965 (page 237), speaking of the
power of the several boards established by or referred to
in Chapter 19 (area boards, boards of trustees of the
respective facilities, etc.) stated that none of them have
the authority to compel any action by the commissioner,
but only "to suggest, to recommend, to report and encourage.
The commissioner
,
under Section 14C, has authority
to appoint to the position of Superintendent of the State
Schools, and provides only that the appointee be qualified
professionally according to specifications detailed by the
section
.
Section 14B establishes the board of trustees for
the individual facility, spelling out the functions of
the board in terms of being the legal entity, "a corpor-
ation for the purpose of taking and holding "the real
estate and personal property given to the institution
of which they are trustees. The board of trustees is
under the exclusive supervision and control of the
9
commissioner.- Nevertheless, it is the board of trustees
more than any other branch of the department (or the state)
that is charged with watchdog duties: Section 14D states
21
that the seven member board shall meet at least three
times per year, visit and familiarize themselves with the
institution, make suggestions to the department to im-
prove the effective, economical and humane administration
of the institution, shall have free access to all books,
records, and accounts, and at all times shall have free
access to the buildings and premises of the facility.
Section 14D(e) even provides: "They may at any time cause
the superintendent or any officer or employee of their
respective public institution to appear before them and
answer any questions or produce any books or documents
relative to the public institution." In operation this
arrangement amounts to self policing in an area where
(as is so typically the case with governmental regulatory
agencies) experience demonstrates that self policing is
unjustifiable and unwarranted. It has not been respon-
sibly achieved in the past, and there is no evidence to
believe that these functions can be performed by anybody
or any office not having full independence of the department
of Mental Health or other state agency with which the depart-
ment might be expected to have a natural alignment of per-
spective .
The enabling portion of Chapter 19 appears in Section
26: "The department may from time to time adopt such
rules and regulations as it deems necessary to carry out:
the provisions of this chapter, and may amend or repeal
the same." Characteristically, enabling legislation does
not go into detail, but rather sets out the minimum and
maximum bounds of proposed activity, establishes general
objectives, reposes power and authorizes continuing,
amendatory revision. Consequently it is in the body
of regulations issued in pursuance of Section 26 that
we discover how (in detail but on paper) the department
snd its subordinated units are actually supposed to function
under law.
The department nevertheless must function within the
broad bounds of applicable legislative and constitutional
provisions, the most notable legislative provision being
Chapter 888 of the Laws of the Commonwealth of 1970,
embodied into the General Laws as G. L. Chapter 123. The
law is commonly called the Massachusetts Mental Health Act.
The Mental Health Act, just as Chapter 19 of the
General Laws, enables the department to issue regulations
establishing procedures and standards for "the reception,
examination, treatment, restraint, transfer and discharge
of . . . mentally retarded persons in departmental facilitie
(Section 2)
It would at this point be appropriate to restate what
is meant by the terms "mental illness" and "mental retar-
dation." Regulation 1 of the DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH
23
REGULATIONS defines (for purposes of involuntary commitment)
mental illness' as a "substantial disorder of thought, mood,
perception, orientation, or memory which grossly imoairs
judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or
ability to meet the ordinary demands of life." Alcoholism
is excluded for purposes of involuntary commitment, but
available as a basis for voluntary commitment. Regulation
2 of the REGULATIONS defines "mental retardation" as
"inadequately developed or impaired intelligence as
determined by clinical authorities as described in the
regulations hereunder, and which substantially limits
a person's ability to function in the community." The
regulation correlates different levels of mental retar-
dation with the degree of deficiency in general intellectual
functioning and adaptive behavior. It also states that
a mentally retarded person may be considered to be men-
tally ill, as defined in the REGULATIONS, provided that
no such person shall be considered to be mentally ill
solely by virtue of his mental retardation.
In this paper I will limit my attention to the area
of mental retardation, leaving aside the unique difficulties
presented by any consideration of mental illness.
As noted above, the Act eliminates involuntary commit-
ment of a mentally retarded person to a state facility.
If a person is at least 16 years of age he may apply for
24
voluntary admission, and a parent or legal guardian may
apply on behalf of a person under the age of majority (18)
or a person under guardianship. Any person so admitted
"shall be free to leave such facility at any time," or
may be freely withdrawn by the parent or guardian, upon
three days notice to the superintendent of the facility. 10
The REGULATIONS further provide that an applicant
for conditional voluntary admission must be informed of
the three day notice provision established by Section 11
of the Act (a precondition of voluntary withdrawal from
the facility)
,
and that he "be given an opportunity to
inspect and visit the living quarters and wards of the
facility if he elects to do so prior to admission," and
that he "be informed of the civil rights which he retains
after admissionn to the facility, as established in Chapter
123, Sections 23 and 25. n11
Nothing in the Act or the REGULATIONS prescribes the
manner or circumstances of imparting civil rights infor-
mation, but what is prescribed to be imparted is Section
23 and Section 25 of the Act. It is clear, however, that
elsewhere than the two cited sections the Act provides
for the civil rights of the facility resident, and limi-
tation to these sections alone is of questionable adequacy
.
Further, it is inappropriate to consider only the rights
retained, since law and justice would seem to require that
25
all rights otherwise possessed by the individual are retained
with certain stated and limited exceptions. These exceptions
should perhaps be discussed; and a right not discussed
or stated to be limitedly denied should be presumed to be
retained, absent a showing of its justified denial on any
occasion
.
The 'civil rights' of a mentally retarded person
specifically referred to in Sec. 23 & 25 include:
1 - To be provided with stationery and postage in
reasonable amounts.
2 - To have free and unrestricted mailing privileges.
3 - To be visited at all reasonable times by anyone un-
less he is ill or incapacitated and the superintendent
determines that such a visit would be unreasonable.
4 - To wear his own clothes.
5 - To keep and use his own personal possessions inclu-
ding toilet articles.
6 - To keep and be allowed to spend a reasonable sum
of his own money for canteen expenses and small purchases.
7 - To have access to individual storage space for his
private use.
8 - To have reasonable access to telephones to make
and receive confidential calls.
9 - To refuse shock treatment.
10
- To refuse lobotomy.
26
Other rights specified in the regulations of
the department
.
12 - Other rights guaranteed by lav/
, (emphasis added)
13 - No person, solely by reason of his admission or
commitment in any capacity to the treatment or
care of the department, shall be deemed to be
incompetent to manage his (own) affairs,
14 - to contract,
15 - to hold professional or occupational or vehicle
operators licenses, or
16 - to make a will.
Departmental regulations shall not restrict the rights
listed above as 13 through 16 ; but according to Section
23, the rights listed above as 1 through 12 may be denied
for good cause by the superintendent or his designee
and a statement of the reasons for any such denial entered
in the treatment record of such person.
It is incredible that any of the individual's "other
rights guaranteed by law" may so easily and so autocratically
be denied with what amounts to lip service to due process
in the procedural formalities which place a very slight
burden on the superintendent. In practice, the superin-
tendent's judgment or decision based on that judgment is
not usually challenged; or if it is challenged it is only
with great loss of time, effort, money and ultimately the
right itself that is sought to be preserved in any such
effort. No panel or board of review is established to
monitor or pronounce upon the just and constitutional
exercise of this awesome authority given to the super-
intendent; and it is integral to the thesis of this paper
that this function is essential to the requirements of
justice
,
and ought to be legislatively mandated to the
independent office of counsel for the retarded, or its
equivalent
.
Regulation MR 102 (which is based upon Chapter 19,
Sections 23, 25 and 29) addresses the legal and civil
rights of retarded persons with the following language:
(1) The greatest care shall be taken to protect
the civil and legal rights of all retarded persons.
All reasonable care shall be given to insuring
that residents of all institutions for the mentally
retarded are protected, have humane treatment and
care, and are allowed such privileges as are their
right, with due regard for the welfare of the gen-
eral public, the limitations imposed by the resident'
disability and the rights of other individuals.
(2) No resident of an institution for the mentally
retarded shall be discriminated against on the
basis of race, creed, sex, or age. Racial segre-
gation shall not be practiced in institutions for
28
the retarded.
(3) (This section substantially restates the rights
listed above as 1 through 12)
(4) The legal and civil rights of the retarded shall
include the right to privacy and protection from
commercial exploitation; (a) no resident shall be
photographed, interviewed, or exposed to public
view without the written consent of his custodian
and his own consent, if obtainable, and (b) no
resident shall be identified publicly by name or
address without the written consent of his custodian
and his own consent, if obtainable.
(5) The right of worship shall be accorded to all
residents who desire it. Provisions for religious
worship shall be made available to residents and,
as nearly as possible and practical, provisions for
religious activities for persons of differing creeds
shall be non-discriminatory ; however, no individual
shall be coerced into engaging in any religious
activities
.
In notable addition to the above, Section 21 of the Act
limits the use of restraint of any kind "which is unnecessary
for the safety of the person being transported or other
persons likely to come in contact with him." And in the
case of residents not being transported, restraint may be
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used "only in cases of emergency such as the occurrence of,
or serious threat of, extreme violence, personal injury,
or attempted suicide." Section 29 of the Act makes it
mandatory on the department "in cooperation with other
state departments and agencies
. .
. (to) cause to be
given to persons under its care instruction and education
as may be appropriate for such persons to undertake,
especially persons who are unable to engage in programs
for patient-trainees." In addition to this very important
right to be educated, the Sections also mandate the estab-
lishment of work programs with approved pay scales for
participating residents. Section 31 gives the resident the
right to obtain free medicine and drugs, with certain
reasonable restrictions.
No effort will be made to catalogue all the rights,
civil or legal, of the mentally retarded resident of a
state facility. It would be a list of enormous length, and
would perhaps be nothing more or le% than a line by line
transcription of the Act and other relevant law, every pro-
vision of which might be construed as either directly or
indirectly granting to the individual resident a right
in the sense of a standing to sue for its enforcement .
This legislation in conjunction with the rules and
regulations issued thereunder has established a classifi-
cation of persons within the jurisdiction of the Common-
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wealth of Massachusetts according to their qualities of
"inadequately developed or impaired intelligence." This
scheme of classification is to correspond to a differen-
tiation of persons in fact along the same lines, and there
must be something near consensus that special legislation
for this class of persons is appropriate. What must be
assumed for purposes of this paper is that no creditable
challenge can be levelled against the enactment of legis-
lation simpliciter dealing with this class of persons;
what remains as a matter of concern is whether the legis-
lation ought to be in its existing form or whether there
ought to be changes in the form of the legislation such that
nothing directly therein prescribed or authorized runs
afoul of more fundamental concerns of our society. Notable
in this regard is the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution, treatment of
which will be undertaken at length in this paper. In addition
to the equal protection clause, it would not be inappropriate
to investigate the applicability of the due process clause,
civil rights legislation, and innumerable other legal and
moral components of our social structure which, in direct
conflict with a given provision of legislation for the
retarded, would properly be given preference.
Some preliminary considerations are in order. First,
with regard to the voluntariness of the admission, it must
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be observed that within the range of those whose mental
condition qualifies them for admission a wide spectrum
exists ranging from those whose condition is near the
borderline of normalcy all the way to those whom the
state terms "profoundly retarded." The term "profoundly
retarded" is defined in Regulation HR 116 as indicating
that the individual designated is "functioning at least
5 standard deviations below the mean of standardized
scales (e. g., below 20 IQ on the Stanford-Binet Scale),
is very markedly deficient in self help, social and commun-
ication skills, and will probably always need protective
care." Levels of mental retardation arc described in
terms of the degree of deficiency in general intellectual
functioning and adaptive behavior as determined by clinical
authorities within or without the department, as else-
where detailed in the Regulations. Typically, one or
several buildings at a facility will house persons of this
segment of the resident pppulation, and such buildings
demonstrate to the uninitiated samples of the worst of the
conditions to which earlier reference was made. The scope
of this paper does not permit in depth survey of these
conditions; but what must now be noted in conjunction
with voluntary admissions is that only by undue extension
in meaning can the term 'voluntary' be appropriately used
to such persons. The options available to the profoundly
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retarded person and his family are realistically limited.
To speak of a profoundly retarded person admitting himself
is absurd. His family's options include keeping him at home,
^t great emotional and financial strain (if physically it
can be accomplished at all) normally requiring continuous
supervision and not untypically being the prelude to the
disintegration of the family itself. Or the family might
place the person in highly priced private facilities where
standards of care and treatment are accorded to the degree
of financial accountability of the family. This simply
is not available to the average candidate for admission to
the state facility. There is, moveover, a higher statis-
tical probability that persons in this classification come
from the lower social segments, and least of all can afford
alternatives to state facilities. When recourse is had
by state personnel to the argument, in defense of charges
of misfeasance or malfeasance of legal responsibility, that
the individual is 'free to leave whenever he may choose,'
the words ring hollow as much as in the statement that
the rich man and the poor man are equally 'free' to sleep on
the park bench. When circumstances inhibit the adoption
of any alternative the use of the term 'freedom' in describing
the situation must be qualified accordingly; and in its
application to the profoundly retarded member of a poor
family the term must be understood to coexist with physical
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unfreedom to adopt any alternative to public institution-
alization. So qualified
,
its use in argument is thoroughly
disingenuous
.
Of concern to the person whom legislation places within
a given classification for purposes of that law's oper-
ation is not only the substance of the law in question
but also its administration. It is to this two pronged
question that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
amendment may be fruitfully applied. For just as a law
which arbitrarily classifies for purposes of dispensing
benefits or imposing burdens is 'unconstitutional' within
the meaning of "equal protection of the laws," so also
are a person's rights, guaranteed by this clause, infringed
by the unequal administration of otherwise equal laws.
The positive laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
dealing with the mentally retarded, while nevertheless
exposed to the criticisms mentioned above, are perhaps
among the more enlightened laws in the country. What more
directly touch upon the lives of the residents of the state
facility, however, are the acts and decisions of administra-
tive personnel. This is the area where charges of unequal
treatment typically arise, and to which the general
thrust of this paper is directed.
By the character of the legislation and even the name
of the law itself, the Massachusetts Mental Health Act
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(together with other related laws such as G. L. Chapter 19)
singles out a segment of society as being within the scope
of its application
,
conforming to what legislative drafts-
men saw to be a singling out by nature of a segment of
that society according to its mental or intellectual
characteristics
. These characteristics were seen to be
at odds with those we have taken to be standard or above
standard. Not only is this not violative of our Federal
Constitution, but rather we would expect a morally sensitive
government to make special provision for those with special
needs on the theory, I imagine, that a just government
should legislate for each according to his needs.
Notwithstanding the lofty idealism of the draftsmen,
statutes and executory regulation fall to less farsighted
agents for implementation; and it is in this context
that class legislation (of which the Act is typical) can
lead to results which are violative of the equal protection
clause. When in a given situation it is observed that
discrimination is occurring which is seen to be violative
of constitutional rights, it must first be determined
whether the law that is being implemented is unconstitu-
tional or whether an equal lav/ is being unequally adminis-
tered. To this end it is proper to survey judicial
decisions which purport to construe the notion of 'equality'
within its meaning in the equal protection clause.
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IV
All persons born or naturalized in the United States
are United States citizens and citizens of the state
in which they reside; and a state is forbidden to deny
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws. This is as expressed in the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution
.
The phrase 'equal protection of the laws' is virtu-
ally mute in guiding the conduct of the states. Cases
and controversies resolved before the courts of the states
and the courts of the United States have, however, created
a pattern of meaning for the phrase, the most interesting
for our purposes being the decisions of the courts of
Massachusetts. The courts of a state, just as much as
its administrative agencies, are the 'state;' and in the
statements made in a court's decision we find authoritative
commitment to standards which for all other purposes we may
legitimately call upon the state to acknowledge as admissions
and apply accordingly.
A state in its laws and in its actions may not pre-
scribe or do anything which has the effect of denying to
any individual or class of individuals the equal protection
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1 9
of the laws. Nowhere has the phrase 'equal protection
of the laws been precisely defined, 1- and moreover it
is not even susceptible of exact delimitation
.
14 No gen-
zation can be laid down that is all-inclusive
,
18
rather
each case must be decided as it arises, on its own facts
.
16
The guarantee of the equal protection clause has,
however, been held to mean, among other things, that no
person or class of persons shall be denied the same pro-
tection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or
other classes of persons in 'like circumstances
,
17 in their
'life,' 'liberty,' 'property,' and 'pursuit of happiness .' 18
The rights of all persons must rest upon the same rule under
1 9the same circumstances
.
Most' fundamentally stated, the equal protection clause
is not limited to state's acts in 'protecting' its citi-
zens; rather it requires that all persons shall be treated
alike under like circumstances and conditions, both in
privileges conferred and in the liabilities and depri-
vations imposed. The highest courts of the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts, in a long line of cases, have frequently
and consistantly subscribed to this principle, elsewhere
20
enunciated at length by the United States Supreme Court.
For the state to favor one class but not another similarly
situated is to deprive the class of those not so favored.
Precision is crucial in characterization of situation, cir-
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cumstances or conditions as being 'similar,' and further
in the determination that the similarities are relevant,
ot appropriate, to the purposes of the legislation (or
of the state) under consideration. Por the unar~
ticulated concern of the courts which demands relevance to
statutory purposes is that given any two articles or objects
in the universe, there is some (however small) set of
characteristics the possession of which by both of the two
renders them 'similar' in circumstances. Conversely,
dissimilarity may be established via the same analysis.
Classification as 'mentally retarded' for purposes of
admission to state institutions classes together all
those persons falling below a given level of deficiency
in general intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior,
undifferentiating the degrees of retardation of the persons
within that classification. But identical treatment of a
profoundly retarded person and a borderline retarded person
cannot be justified simply by pointing out that they are
both retarded, but must now somehow take into account and
be relevant to the individualizing characteristics of the
persons to whom treatment will directed and to the nature
of the treatment itself. The departmental regulations
acknowledge this in Regulation MR 116 by establishing,
for administrative purposes, five levels of retardation:
profound, severe, moderate, mild, and borderline. It is
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equally clear that in many respects other than those
entailed in a person's being retarded, the institutional-
ized mentally retarded person in a state facility has
the same legal posture as all other state citizens with
regard to certain legal rights which are not conditioned
upon factors of intellectual functioning or adaptive
behavior. Many of these are in fact codified in the Mental
Health Act and the departmental regulations. It is too
frequently the case that these factors which are not
relevant to a given law are precisely the factors which
prevent a facility resident from fully appreciating the
extent to which the treatment accorded to him has the
effect of disenfranchising him from his entitled partici-
pation in societal functions and privileges to the unhin-
dered extent of his proven or potential ability.
Central to our consideration is the relationship
between the observable physical and mental differences
and the objects of the classification. Reasonable, non-
arbitrary classification requires that different treat-
ment be based upon substantive differences having a
reasonable relation to the objects or persons dealt with
and to the public purpose sought to be achieved by the
legislation involved. In this regard, the courts of
Massachusetts have held that the terms 'arbitrary' and
'discriminatory' have the same meaning.
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'Invidious discrimination' on any fact situation is
forbidden, but the constitutional guarantee does not
require identical treatment for all persons without
consideration of the difference in relevant circumstances
.
21
It might also be pointed out here that in making out a
case of a violation of the equal protection clause we
have also in all liklihood made out a case of a violation
of the due process clause as well, and probably other
state and federal civil rights lav/s. The scope of our
present inquiry will intentionally be limited to the
equal protection clause.
The Fourteenth Amendment is a charge upon the legis-
lative and other acts of 'a state' - not private individuals
within the state except in so far as they act in the official
capacity of representative of the state itself. It is
state action that must be assessed as affording equal or
unequal protection of the laws within the scope of the
equal protection clause. The federal government itself
22
is not bound by the eqiual protection clause. The present
inquiry has discussed the Massachusetts Department of
Mental Health, an agency of the state, but not itself
the state. Are the acts, then, of the department the acts
of the state? In an area of the law so technical as this
the question is not frivolous. Decisions, however, uni-
formly construe the clause to be applicable to all the
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departments of state government, whether legislative,
executive, or judicial ," 3 and to all the instrumentalities
by which a state acts
.
24 it can thus be taken as well
founded that the acts of the Department of Mental Health
and its personnel and agents are the acts of the state
for constitutional purposes.
Acts of the department thought to be violative of
the equal protection clause present us with the issue
of what to do about it. Cases have indicated that the
Fourteenth Amendment is not remedial or punitive, but to
the extent possible the action in question will be set
aside. The violation may be cited as a basis for a court
of equity jurisdiction to grant an injunction against
the continuing violation. It cannot be made the basis
for damages, since it is presumed that the person affected
will seek redress by conventional legal remedies. 2 ^
As earlier mentioned, the Mental Health Act's pro-
visions relative to admission and discharge are enlightened
and reasonable in comparison to other jurisdictions.
An individual mentally retarded resident is virtually free
at any time to discharge himself. Some have seized upon
this point to argue that treatment thought to be discrim-
inatory is really not discrimination, for the reason that
any classificatory statute, regulation or act of the state
under which those included and those excluded from the class
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in question are free to place themselves in the same posi-
tion as the other is, if discrimination at all, a purely
academic form of discrimination. For their authority thev
cite cases in line with Hunter vs. Colfax Consol. Coal Co.,
175 Iowa 245, 154 NW 1037, 157 NW 145. For reasons men-
tioned earlier such liberty of class inclusion, for the
retarded resident, is illusory. His choice is most
definitely not to remain in the institution and endure,
or to discharge himself and avoid, an arbitrary act or treat-
ment; rather the choice is actually to remain and endure
one bit of bad treatment or discharge himself and perish
in a society whose demands are beyond his ability.
Moreover, the argument based on the free interchangeability
of class inclusion and class exclusion limps in that those
who register higher than the designated level in the
intellectual screening process are simply and absolutely
not free to place themselves in the position of the resident
toward whom the treatment in question is directed.
Those who argue in this way (the number of whom has
fallen off markedly in recent years) either practice a
form of self-deception or more probably indulge themselves
in outright hypocracy.
The nature of legislation is such that classification
is entailed. Statutes and regulations characteristically
spell out the scope of their operation, differentiating
4those within their scope of operation from those outside
that scope
.
26 To be classified is to be made or to be
recognized as unequal - and a showing of inequality under
the law or act in question is not enough to have established
its unconstitutionality under the equal protection clause.
Classification of persons or things must be 'reasonable
for the purposes of the legislation ,' 27 must be 'based
on proper and justifiable distinctions, considering the
2 p 2 9purpose of the law,' 'clearly not arbitrary,' and
'must not be a subterfuge to shield one class or unduly
burden another class, or to oppress unlawfully in its
administration .
'
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It is in the concrete framework of the administra-
tion of the Mental Health Act and related law that we
most frequently encounter instances of unconstitutional
treatment of the residents. The extension of the equal
protection clause to acts, as well as legislation, is of
vital importance. What is proscribed by the equal pro-
tection clause is discrimination, whether it be embodied
in statutory form or in that statute's administration.
Discriminatory administration of the law is unconstitu-
tional under this clause . 31 It has been held that the val-
idity of a statute under the equal protection clause
often depends on how it is construed and applied. J A
provision (of a law) not objectionable on its face may be
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adjudged unconstitutional because of its effect in actual
operation. 33 The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the un-
equal enforcement of valid laws as well as the enforce-
ment of invalid laws. 34
Decisions may be cited in point that actual discrim-
ination arising from the 'administering of a law* is
as potent in creating a denial of equality of rights as
a discrimination made by a law.^^ Depending on the nature
of the law involved, it is not necessary that the discoverv
of the elements of unconstitutionality among its provisons
requires the voiding of the entire law; rather, the uncon-
stitutional elements may be eliminated from the law, and if
what remains is a viable law, fulfilling the purposes for
which the law was originally enacted, it will to that extent
be retained in force. When to a serious degree legislation
inadequately insures against abusive administration, it
is arguable that unconstitutionality inheres in this
insufficiency. To render the law constitutional, we do
not in this case need to eliminate provisions, but to
add them; or in lieu of further provisions of the par-
ticular legislation in question, other legislation de-
signed to make up for the insufficiency of the challenged
law (for example. House Bill 2690 supplementing the existing
mental health statutes, or its substantial equivalent).
Other factors must be considered in this regard such as the
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nature of the interests adversely affected. Insufficiency
in administrative provisions in legislation dealing with
the governance of lives of the mentally retarded must
clearly be less tolerable than insufficiency of equal
degree in legislation dealing with state highway contracts,
with the establishment of a commission to set official
holidays, and so on.^ & ^
An improper legislative purpose might be the basis
for charging that a law is in violation of the equal
protections clause; but no one contends that the state's
mental laws are contaminated with improper purpose or
motive. Nevertheless a long line of cases point out that
in addition to a scrutiny of the legislative purpose,
regard should be given to the means provided for its
administration. Where administrative powers are con-
ferred which permit unjust discrimination betv/een persons
otherwise in relevant and similar circumstances, the courts
have found there to have been violations of the equal
19protection clause.
From the foregoing we might be seen to have reached
the absurd position of having established all executory
legislation unconstitutional by being violative of the
equal protection clause. We simply know that our highest
appellate courts would never seriously entertain argument
citing the above cases as controlling precedent in any
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case aimed at the absurd conclusion just mentioned.
Instead, when cases come to the court in that posture,
they impose the burden on the one making the allegation
of unconstitutionality (founded on insufficiency of admin-
istrative procedures) to establish facts amounting to an
"intentional violation of the essential principle of
practical uniformity ." 40 This has on occasion been held
to mean a "fixed and continuous policy of unjust discrim-
ination
.
" 41
It is important here to note that we must not only
be concerned with state laws dealing directly with the
mentally retarded, such as the Mental Health Act, but
also all other legislation which designates the scope of
its operation (or is so unequally administered) so as to
exclude mentally retarded persons, either expressly or
(more probably) by implication, without sustaining the
burden of demonstrating some relevant difference between
the class included and the class of the retarded. Legis-
lation cannot be judged by theoretical standards, but
must be tested in the concrete conditions which induced
it . 40 Massachusetts courts have in fact held that in
passing on the constitutionality of a statute it is
important to examine into its effect in operation and
the results it is intended to accomplish . 40
The courts approach any consideration of the constitu-
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tionality of a law's formulation or administration with
a tendency to impose a very high burden of persuasion on
that side of a case or controversy arguing for unconsti-
tutionality. What amounts to a presumption of constitu-
tionality is often supported by recourse to vague and
confusing concepts. The Massachusetts courts have held
that "a statutory discrimination will not be set aside
as the denial of the equal protection of the laws if
any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify
it .
"
44 (emphasis added) The courts also point out that
equal protection of the lav/s is something which submits
to the consideration of degree. The exercise of state
police power to classify has been held to admit of a
wide scope of discretion and the Fourteenth Amendment
may be called upon to avoid what is classified or done
only when "it is without any reasonable basis and there-
fore purely arbitrary ." 45 Illustratively there is such
language as "practical equality is constitutional equal-
ity ," 46 and as stating that the term 'equal' (as used in
statutes) is construed to mean "substantially equal and
not identical ." 47 Arbitrariness is dispelled on a showing
of proportionality such that "in the absence of relations
or conditions requiring a different result, equity (equal
protection cf the laws) will treat all members of a class
as on an equal footing, and will distribute benefits or
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impo&e burdens and charges equally or in proportion to
the several interests, and without preferences ." 4 ^ And
again, on proportionality, the equal protection of the laws
with respect to taxation purposes does "not require identity
of treatment, but only (1) that classification rest on
real and not feigned differences, (2) that the distinctions
have some relevance to the purpose for which the classi-
fication is made, and (3) that the different treatments
be not so disparate relative to differences in classi-
fication as to be wholly arbitrary." 49
In further construction of the term "equal" and the
phrase "equal protection of the law" the courts have had
recourse to obscurities such as: "A classification having
some reasonable basis does not offend against the equal
protection clause because it is not made with mathematical
nicety or because in practice it results in some inequal-
ity. (emphasis added)
One of the clearest judicial statements made concern-
ing the meaning of the clause was made by a Texas court
in the context of a tax suit: "The equal protection clause
of the State and Federal Constitutions means that the
rights of all persons must rest on the same rule under
similar circumstances, and apply to all the powers of the
state which can affect the individual, including the power
of taxation. 51 (emphasis added)
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The foregoing has been an abbreviated effort to sur-
vey court decisions in order to abstract therefrom the
essential ingredients of the notion of equality as it
pertains to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. It is evident that such judicial statements
parallel Perelman's definition for 'formal justice,' of
which more will be said later. These decisions have not
been formulated along lines of philosophical analysis of
the concepts that come into play in the controversy before
the court: but in effect and without having systematically
articulated the reasoning process employed by the deciding
judge, the decisions focus in on the same points as
Perelman in his more in depth consideration of the
subject
.
Society has achieved virtual consensus in calling
for justice for the mentally retarded (no less than for
us all). So long, however, as justice remains an abstrac-
tion it can comfortably be championed by all segments of
society. Confusion and discord replace emotive unity
when we set out to secure justice in the concrete. While
no one calls publicly for unjust treatment or policies
for the mentally retarded, perhaps one who did so might
be seen as possessing a certain redeeming candor and honesty
not characterizing another who professes to secure justice
to the retarded in ways that, upon analysis, are seen to
lead more to its denial.
Those coninc into official professional contact
with the institutionalized mentally retarded person
undertake a task of enormous difficulty and complexity; it
is thus not surprising that disagreements should arise
concerning alternative treatments or policies of treat-
ment. The fact alone of disagreement more likely evi-
dences mere difference of honest opinion regarding the
means of achieving a commonly held professional objective,
rather than disparate views of the objective itself. But
it is precisely because justice has been viewed abstractly
and because little if any uniformity exists with regard to
what is captured within the term's scope and meaning that
it becomes necessary to develop a view of justice within
the concrete context of the class in question.
I believe that outright bad faith is not so commonly
encountered in this inquiry as much as simple neglect,
legislatively created and administratively sustained. And
it is beyond the scope of this paper to go into the ques-
tion of motives and personal psychologies of persons in
positions of administrative power. But to the extent that
we can rectify the continuing neglect through amendatory
legislation, and to the extent that such an effort is
itself supported by a proper understanding of the notions
of justice and equality, specifically within its meaning
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in the context of the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment
,
then accordingly a discussion of these
notions is a proper component of this inquiry, and an
apt premise to the thesis that H. B. 269C or its substantial
equivalent ought to be enacted into law.
V
In his work The Idea of Justice and the Problem of
Argument
,
Ch . Perelman analyses the concept of justice as
not simple, but as complex, containing a constant formal
element and a varying material element. Formal justice
is then initially defined as the formal principle requiring
one to treat the like alike, while the variable material
element provides the criteria according to which a par-
ticular respect of likeness is specified. The aforemen-
tioned consensus thus appears to reduce to a popular
endorsement of formal justice. Disagreement arises
characteristically in the determination of criteria, the
selection or specification of characteristics which in
turn determine 'likeness,' these to be known as 'esential
characteristics.' He talks of persons forming (for a given
purpose) 'essential categories.' The disagreements which
arise amonq departmental professionals may thus be seen ao
examples of conflicting concrete formulae of justice, dis-
5agreements relative to essential characteristics and
essential categories.
Our survey of judicial decisions has revealed that
the holdings or dicta in cases discussing the notion of
equality in the constituional context are replete with
endorsements of formal justice, leaving its application to
the facts of the given cases as the court's contribution
to a determination of concrete justice. The decisions,
being mixtures of law and fact, become part of the body
of precedent which (to more or less degree depending on
jurisdictional, factual, and other relevant considerations)
give support to the slogan "stare decisis."
"Stare decisis" is not, however, the ultimate virtue
in these considerations. Justice William 0. Doualas, in
an interview on the CBS Evening News of September 6, 1972,
stated that "in constitutional matters, 'stare decisis' has
least standing." We should feel entirely free to choose
not to follow precedent in the decisions relatinq to the
treatment of the mentally retarded, nor to follow precedented
treatment itself, having sustained, I believe, the burden
of persuasion that such treatment offends anybody's pre-
analytic sense of justice. For reasons that are part of
the problem itself, there has been no direct judicial con-
sideration of the offending conditions until recent days,
and even then the judicial resolution was , as earlier indi-
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cated, based on compromise and settlement and falls short
of becoming a constructive contribution to precedent.
The public call for justice for the retarded forces
us to a metajudicial analysis of the relation of equality,
for use in relating mentally retarded persons to other
both within and without the category of the retarded, as
defined in the Mental Health Act. Perelman compares and
contrasts the relation of equality with the relation of
identity in the following way: A and B are equal if they
are interchangeable, if they share properties, and if
the same truth value characterizes all propositions con-
cerning each, while A and B are identical if they desig-
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nate the same object. Justice will clearly employ the
relation of equality as distinguished above from identity,
and if further understood to be broadly enough construed to
encompass persons who, though equal in some respects,
are definitely not equal in other respects. How then is
a rule of justice than mandates equal treatment for equal
beings to deal with beings that strictly viewed are neither
identical nor equal? lie elsewhere states that typically
complaints are registered against alleged unjust treat-
ment in that a person is not being treated like another,
or if he is being treated in the same way , that he should
be treated differently, or better. ^ With the relation of
identity ruled out of consideration, differences of all sorts
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are specified in support of the complaint; and it is
precisely that differences that ought not to have exer-
cised any influence cn the decision (or law, or policy, or
act, etc.) did so, or that differences that ought to
have operated in one's favor were without effect. "Cer-
tain elements, regarded as essential, and nothing else,
ought to have been taken into consideration ." 54 Failure
of reference to relevant factors or reference to irrele-
vant factors thus renders a decision, for example, unjust.
"Injustice, it seems, does not result here from the unequal
treatment of identical persons, but the unequal treatment
different persons the differences between whom were
irrelevant in the instance ." 55 Conversely, the equal
treatment of persons who, according to the criteria in
question, ought to have been assigned to different cate-
gories for which unequal treatment was provided, is
also an instance of injustice.
The rule of (formal) justice is in this connection
restated as requiring that those who are essentially
similar (i.e., having no essential differences) should
be treated alike, neither specifying when they are essen-
tially similar nor how, if essentially similar, they are
then to be treated. Specification of essential similarity
is the function of 'the rule,' whether the rule be expressed
in positive law, tradition, administrative regulation or
the like. If the rule specifies A and B as essentially
similar then its operation to be formally just must mete
out equal treatment.
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The notion of "static justice" has had a history of
faithful service in places like Belchertown, providing
institutional administrations a defense to charges of
unjust treatment of residents. When a rule of the facility
was challenged as being unjust, it would be humbly sub-
mitted in response that because the rule operated on all
residents alike it was therefore not unjust. Static jus-
tice calls for the observance of an established rule
without regard to the rule's content. Conformity to pre-
cedent is in this context seen to be not without its
hazards; that while being an appropriate factor (or even
necessary condition) of rational decision making it can
never be its only ingredient (or sufficient condition)
.
Historical perspective reveals that there has often been
consensus favoring treatment which was consistently followed
at times past but which is now held to be unjust by most.
Rules, acts and men are appropriately characterized
as just or unjust. An act is said to be just if it is in
conformity with the correct application of a rule, suggest-
ing the patriotic assertion that we are a country of laws
and not of men. In the determination of the justneso o_
an act, Perelman points out that we must first agree upon
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the appropriate applicable rule, and must then further agree
upon its interpretation
.
56 What is not in question for
this determination is the justness of the rule itself.
The process is rational and deductive. It has been
pointed out that decisions rendered and actions per-
formed according to rule or precedent satisfy; that it is
natural and rational that a decision or action in one
case be essentially the same decision or action for other
similar cases. Change demands justification.
Persons are said to be just or unjust simply as a
function of the justice or injustice of their acts, pre-
senting us with none of the conceptual difficulty that
we encounter in the determination of the justice or the
injustice of the rule. Is the rule itself just? It
can at least be said with confidence and as a necessary
condition thereof that a just rule is not arbitrary; it
must have some basis in reason, "even if that basis does
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not command unanimous agreement." Laws (even otherwise
good laws, per se) imposed as a mere demonstration of
the power and putative authority of those imposing them
are paradigmatically arbitrary, and therefore unjust.
Reference to "pre-existing reality or to a rational system
C O
designed with a view to giving effects to an ideal end"
are cited by Perelman as taking the rule out of the realm
of the arbitrary.
Where conflicts are encountered in simultaneous appli-
cation of several rules, recourse must be had either to
a rule of a higher order in which the several rules
may be reconciled as compatible or reconcilable variables,
or else to an equity forum wherein a judge will divert
the technical operation of a rule to avoid clear injustice
in the immediate and perhaps unanticipated fact situation
presented to the court. Equity is thus seen as taking
the rough edges off the mechanical operation of the law;
but if equity too frequently supercedes law, then in the
absence of a change in the law, the lav/ itself is week-
ened. Notwithstanding the merit of such statements as:
"The passage to and fro between certainty and equity,
between equity and certainty, is the very life of juris-
prudence and determines more particularly the idea we
form of the role in the legal system of the supreme court,"
rules should by and large be followed and should be just.
Rules of concrete justice are founded in what Perelman
originally felt to be the arbitrarily chosen values of
the rule-giver; and while the determination of whether
a rule of concrete justice flov/ed logically from the given
value was susceptible to deductive reasoning, never-
theless all that could be done, he thought, with regard
to the resolution of disagreements concerning competing
values was to note the fact that differences existed.
As Hart notes in his introduction to Perelman' s book dis-
agreements of this order concerning the characteristics
to be taken as essential in the application of formal
justice result in different concrete formulae of justice.
If a shared and wider moral principle can be brought to
light the disagreement might end there; but usually
this is not the case. Perelman progresses from a position
holding that reason has no part to play in disagreements
over values to a position holding that some degree of
reasoning about values is attainable in techniques of
"actual argument." No argument takes place in a void:
"when the disputants approach each other they already
owe allegiance to certain common principles of both
thought and conduct and are eager to classify the instant
case under familiar traditional general rubrics and then
treat it as other cases so classified in the past have
been treated. Argument most often proceeds by linking
a disputed thesis to precedents already acknowledged
,
and their use in this way is another application of the
formal principle that like cases be treated alike."
As the values of a society shift and change and de-
velop so also do its concrete formulae of justice; and
Perelman analogizes this to the shifting classification
of natural phenomena for inclusion in ever more embracing
scientific laws. The inductive procedures of science in
reformulating statements of natural law become the model:
just as scientific laws are reformulated to take into
account observations of phenomena not in technical con-
formity v/ith earlier statements of the law, so to some
extent do deontic positions yield to reformulation in
the process of resolving disagrements at the normative
base of justice.
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is essentially a prescription for formal jus-
tice, calling for like treatment for persons forming part
of the same essential category. Positive law, such at
the Massachusetts Mental Health Act and the regulations
issued thereunder, establishes the categories, without
which the administration of justice is quite impossible
.
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A state which violates a rule of concrete justice which
it has itself set is, on that occasion, unjust. The
state has made a determination of essential categories
with regard to the mentally retarded, implying to some
extent the value system of that society as reflected in
legislative action and executive performance. While the
matter of admission and discharge from state facilities
appears to come more within the scope of legislatively
determined essential categories, the essential subcate-
gorie$ within that general class, for unnumerable institu
tional purposes, more directly reflects the value system
of the commissioner, the superintendents, and (within the
limits of delegation) the whole line of their subordinates.
No effective forum for the resolution of disagreements
in their determination of essential categories exists
under the present state of the law; furthermore, they
in no way constitute an impartial equity tribunal designed
to prevent the treating with excessive inequality persons
forming part of the same essential category. Where, for
example, the superintendent establishes as an essential
category all those of the residents able to walk and rules
that these and only these shall receive an academic edu-
cation (citing reasons of self mobility and its attendant
administrative convenience)
,
the only court of equity
jurisdiction in or above the facility structure itself is
the facility superintendent himself or his controlled
subordinates. To what extent can one realistically expect
their understanding or assistance in handling the simul-
taneous overlap of the superintendent's established cate-
gory and a proposed alternative which would prescribe (for
example) an academic education for all within that category
comprised of those above a certain minimum level of intel-
lectual ability? Incidentally, this later category is express
provided in the operative positive law, and has never been
fully or effectively implemented by the past superintendents.
The physical transporting of non-ambulatory residents to and
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from the education building has been traditionally elevated
to the status of dominant factor.
Rules of the facility, even if they comply with the
minimal demands of 'static justice,' too often are arbi-
trary in classifying residents in ways calculated more to
simplify administration and the handling of the resident
population than to provide the care and treatment reflected
in and reguired by <-he positive law. Superintendents have
traditionally valued custodial functions higher than
habilitative or rehabilitative functions, and this emphasis
has inevitably played a part in the formulation of institu-
tional rules and policies.
The rules that are codified in statutes or regulations
simply do not and cannot anticipate the innumerable sit-
uations that require the establishment of further uncodified
rules governing the day to day functioning of the institu-
tion; and it is not here suggested that we deprive the
administrators of their rule making function, for to do so
would impair the effectiveness of the facility to the detri-
ment of the residents themselves. But to the extent that
the rule making power is exercised in areas touching on
the basic civil and legal ricrhts of the residents, it
simply cannot be exercised independently of the checks and
balances which could be provided for by the proposed legis-
lation or its substantial equivalent.
In most cases it can be shown that treatments and
policies of treatment which have previously been iso-
lated as preanalytically offensive are in fact not in
conformity with the correct application of an existing
rule of positive law. This is, by definition, unjust.
A grouping of the offensive conditions under the heading
of appropriate civil or legal rights that have been vio-
lated, whether expressly articulated in statute or regu-
lation or incorporated therein by reference, would more
clearly demonstrate this nonconformity. And as difficult
as it may have been to remedy the inequities of purely
institutional rules, so equally are we unequipped at
present to remedy the injustice of acts in direct con-
flict with positive law.
To the suggestion that clearly defined statutory
prescriptions give rise to legal rights to secure their
enforcement it is answerable that the suggestion fails
adequately to take into account the nature of the class
of persons affected. The recognition of rights and the
intelligent pursuit of remedies for their infringement
requires the very abilities, deficiencies in which define
the class itself.
If it is seen that simultaneous application of more
than one provision of the Act or the departmental regula-
tions, being themselves formulae of concrete justice,
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or that the application of the same provision thereof
in different circumstances, produces contradictions
which make it impossible for the requirements of formal
justice ("persons forming part of the same essential cate-
gory ought to be treated alike") to be met, then we are
left with no other recourse than to a forum of equity.
But without legislation similar to that we propose,
these conflicts would never reach an equity tribunal, but
would inevitably be resolved according to the degree of
importance attached by the administrator to the com-
peting characteristics. In effect the administrator
generates new and complex characteristics having at least
as many variables as there are conflicting provisions
of the rule, ranked in his particular order of preference.
The population of the Infirmary building, to cite one
concrete instance at Belchertown, traditionally is comprised
of those whose physical deficiencies and general immobility
have quite rationally rendered them a homogeneous cate-
gory of persons. The building, however, is equipped with
a single elevator whose history of reliability is unim-
pressive. There are two stairwells, which for the limited
number of the building's inhabitants able to walk and able
to negotiate the heavy locked metal doors are otherwise
quite suitable as a means of exiting the building. There
are no adequate ramps for the nonambulatory . There have
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never been more then a handfull of attendants present
to assist in the event of emergency evacuation. But most
interestingly
,
there are state laws requiring adequate
ramps and other equipment and building modification for
buildings designated and used for such purposes. Why have
commissioners and superintendents and stewards and all the
other administrative personnel chosen to resolve the con-
flict between the need for homogeneous housing and a rule
of positive law in favor of the former? What made them see
a conflict between the two at all? But they have seen it as
a conflict and have resolved that conflict in a way that is
unjust. We have, in short, in this instance and in innumer-
able other instances at Belchertown been forced to endure
the imposition of one value system over all others.
The process of "actual argument" to which Perelman
has ultimate recourse as a means of supporting deontic
major premises calling for equal treatment for persons
in a given essential category as against a competing
essential category usually culminates (and usually in a
judicial setting) in statements often used in political
argument in which the notion of equality remains unanalvzed
and is used in a manner "confusina to the advocates,
and encouraging to the enemies, of that ideal." The
usual point of departure in any such argument is a dis-
pute between persons relating to the observable differ-
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ences among members of the combined classes of persons
under discussion. ihe transition from the uncontradicted
assertion of actual observable differences among the mem-
bers of the combined classes to deontic propositions
concerning the sub-classes thereof isolates the point of
divergence between the disputants. Any analysis of the
notion of equality must therefore focus on this trans-
itional area.
Bernard Williams has generated an analysis operating
on the premise that in actual discourse the term 'equality'
is used meaningfully, as making a factual claim relative
to characteristics properly possessed by two or more per-
sons, being neither construed as trivially true ("all per-
sons share a common humanity") nor as absurdly untrue
("no two persons are really equal"). "When the statement
of equality ceases to claim more than is warranted, it
rather rapidly reaches the point where it claims less than
6 3is interesting."
Preanalytic concensus that men should be treated alike
in similar circumstances appears to be the limit of judicial
analysis, at least so far as that analysis has been officially
reported. A corrolary to the principle of formal justice
is that "for every difference in the way men are treated,
some general reason or principle of differentiation must
be given." 6 '*
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The difficulty in stopping analysis at this point
is that the principle makes demands that can simultane-
ously be satisfied by both disputants, each pointing out
actual inequalities that correlate with his own proposed
differences in treatment. While precedents state that
st this point relevance must be considered, it propels
the disputants into evaluative questions with no guide-
lines on the further resolution of their divergent deontic
views
.
In the capacity to feel pain, physical or perceptual,
in the capacity to experience the happiness of affection
or the anguish of its absence, and in the innumerable
other natural capacities that characterize human beings, we
find substance to the ‘trivial* predication of common
humanity to all persons in our society, notwithstanding
that such capacities can vary widely in degree among
actual men. These are among capacities that are possessed
by institutionalized retardates no less than by any of
us; and perahps because of deprivations in skills and
abilities possessed by others in different circumstances,
these persons may well have developed and cultivated such
fundamental capacities to a degree of sensitivity beyond
the so-called normal person. The Belchertown situation
was and might continue to be an example of where "political
and social arrangements . . . systematically neglect these
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characteristics in the case of some groups of men, while
being fully aware of them in the case of others. "65
The moral worth of an individual, as this might be
mirrored in differences in treatment accorded him, cannot
without a "feeling of outrageous absurdity" 66 be dependent
on contingencies such as unequal natural endowment and
fortuitously distributed capacities. Persons differen-
tiated and segregated from society by virtue of intellectual
deficiencies are exposed to administrative reinforcement
of such differentiation by the very social arrangements
themselves. The resident is typically not encouraged
to concentrate on his points of similarity to others in
society, but is through institutional procedures led to
believe that the differences, and not the similarities,
are of ultimate importance. As Williams points out, "men
are at least potentially conscious, to an indeterminate
degree, of their situation and of what I have called
their 'titles,' are capable of reflectively standing
back from the roles and positions in which they are cast;
and this reflective consciousness may be enhanced or
diminished by their social condition." Persons who
believe in the justness and appropriateness of their
social placement collectively and in general constitute
a more easily managed population; and as previously noted,
population management has high standing in the ranking
of administration values. To the extent that the residents
reflect on their placement with such belief, and to the
extent that they believe such placement to be a necessity
of nature with no real opportunities for improvement,
the more it takes on the appearance of what Williams terms
"the deliberate prevention of growth of consciousness,
which is a poisonous element absent from the original
ideal
.
1,68
The consciousness of the resident to the parameters
of his situation is relevant to a matter earlier discussed
- namely, that person's posture with regard to the securing
of civil and legal rights. The Williams analysis makes
a critical distinction between a man's rights (the reasons
why he should be treated in a certain way) and that man's
power to secure those rights (the reasons for and the
means of getting what he deserves) . He cites the case
of a legal right possessed equally by a rich man and a
poor man, in which instance the law granting that right
(without an affirmative action component) can be said to
.be fair and equal only by the cynical, owing to the
expense associated with its attainment. That case anal-
ogizes to our case in point in which consciousness of
rights conferred by the Mental Health Act and related
law is, as a practical matter, a necessary condition
for their attainment. Williams sees the combination
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of relevance of reasons for unequal treatment and the
operativeness of reasons as a strengthening of the prin-
ciple of formal justice: that in addition to giving a
reason for treating persons differently, the reason
should be relevant and socially operative.
It cannot be said that the Massachusetts mental
health laws are socially operative. They are, in fact,
merely administratively operative, institutionally oper-
ative, selectively operative, and in accordance only with
the unsupervised discretion of the state and its agents.
The existence of civil and legal rights is an abstraction
with no power to console those who, for whatever benign
motive, have been deprived of such rights; what is of
concern is the extent to which those rights govern what
actually happens in the lives the institutional residents.
Investigations have established that what actually happens
is traceable less to operative law and regulation than
to administration personality. Such a state of affairs is
incompatible with the notion of justice.
Something that must not be overlooked in discussing
realistically the opportunities that are available to the
institutional resident is that their individual potentials
differ in fact from the potentials of others in a given
society, as a function of their intellectual or other de-
ficiencies. It would be as wrong to hold out the hope of
69
higher educational excellence to a mildly retarded person
as it would be to deprive him altogether of basic learning
Quite obviously we have seldom had to deal with
excesses in the former, while the latter has figured
prominently in current criticisms of the administration's
performance
. To what extent must the state provide
equality of opportunity to the residents? That concept is
very obscure* but notwithstanding the conceptual difficulty
encountered in analyzing the concept of equality of oppor-
tunity, its denial most nearly characterizes institutional’
deprivations than any other concept we have dealt with so
far. Accordingly, it is worth further discussion.
Williams treats the notion of equality of opportunity
in the normal political sense of equality of opportunity
for everyone in society to secure certain goods. The
goods in question are those which, even if not desired
by all, are desired by or for most persons in that society,
and are goods which may be said to be earned, but which
not all who desire can have. The inability of all in a
society to have such goods may be because the goods (1)
are by their very nature limited in number, or (2) are
contingently limited, in the sense that there are certain
conditions of access to them which in fact not everyone
satisfies, there being no intrinsic limit to the numbers
which might gain access to it by satisfying the conditions,
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or (3) are fortuitously limited, such as an inadequacy of
supply. The foregoing analysis yields the conclusion
that for there to be equality of opportunity a limited
good must be allocated on grounds which do not a priori
exclude any section of those that desire it, on grounds
other than those appropriate or rational for the good in
question, where by 'appropriate' grounds is meant grounds
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all have an equal chance of satisfying.
The future of the institutions may well be character-
ized by populations of persons for whom no viable resi-
dential alternative exists. The price they must pay for
the benefits of residence must not be so high as to entail
an involuntary severance from otherwise available oppor-
tunities; most especially is this the case where oppor-
tunities are minimized or curtailed in the name of smooth
institutional management. Equality of opportunity is de-
nied "if the allocation of the good in question in fact
works out unequally or disproportionately between different
sections of society, if the unsuccessful sections are
under a disadvantage which could be removed by further
reform or social action. The Williams analysis con-
tinues with a discussion as to the extent to which the
direct equalling-up of conditions is appropriate to re-
move the operative disadvantage. There is no logical
limit to this process, for persons would have become
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"pure subjects or bearers of predicates, everything else
about them
. . . being regarded as a fortuitous and change-
able characteristic ." 73 Equality of opportunity and
absolute equality converge to identical concepts.
In the context of the state facilities for the retarded
we first encounter and must first deal with institutionally
created disadvantages; before any program of 'reform or
social action' can be effectively initiated we must
reach a starting point where no direct infringement of
rights and opportunities is being perpetrated upon the
resident population by the facility administrators. At
very least there can be no overt discrimination and at
very best there should be a comprehensive habilitative
program (which, by the way, has long been a legislative
mandate) aimed at maximizing resident potential within the
reasonable limitations of the institutional environment.
Neither Williams nor I opt for a Utopianism which
does away with the endless fascinating differences that
exist among the persons that make up our entire social
community. It is a point well made that overemphasis on
equality of opportunity might lead to the destruction of a
certain sense of common humanity which is an ideal of
equality itself.
But conversely it is the principle point of this
paper that programmed reinforcement of natural differences
72
becomes a malignant growth which feeds on itself until
3 person s naturally limited abilities are either dimin-
ished or totally destroyed.
VI
It has been suggested in this paper that maladminis-
tration of the laws that relate to the mentally retarded
has often taken the form of excess imposition of_custodial
protection. Custodial or protective restraint is, never-
theless, as appropriate for the profoundly retarded resident
at a state facility as is its absence for those whom
society deems to be fully competant. It is then the sub-
stantial middle of the spectrum ranging between the two
that requires further analysis. To what extent and in
what way is restraint upon individual self-determination
warranted (or correlatively to what extent is autonomy
justifiably denied) when such restraint is effected by
the state and directed toward marginally retarded residents?
By 'marginally retarded' will be meant essentially a
class of all those who are neither profoundly retarded
nor fully competant, but who occupy the range between the
two
.
By the fact of residence, the resident submits to
the power of the state administrators. That power is
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exercised in ways which might be characterized as mixtures
of protection and limited autonomy. The proportions of
each are at least theoretically correlated with the degree
of mental retardation. Mere autonomy would in theory be
appropriate for the mildly retarded resident than for the
severely retarded resident, for whom in theory more cus-
todial protection would be desirable. But this broad
brush analysis is clearly inadeguate for our oumoses; a
more critical examination is needed into the character-
istics of the entire mid-spectrum class itself.
Departmental regulations have sub-classified the
retarded according to placement on a standardized psycho-
metric scale: the retarded, as a class, are thus defined
as all those testing below 80 IQ on the Stanford-Binet
.
The five sub-classes are: (1) profoundly retarded - those
testing between 0 and 20 IQ on that scale; (2) severely
retarded - those testing between 21 and 35 IQ; (3) moderately
retarded - those testing between 36 and 51 IQ; (4) mildly
retarded - those testing between 52 and 64 IQ; (5) border-
line retarded - those testing between 65 and 79 IQ.
The continuing justification for the very existence of
the institution (which is itself not challenged by this
paper) is that tc some extent every truly mentally retarded
person does require the structured protection of society.
But in what areas and to what degree the state's protective
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power should transform from supervision or advice into
restrictions upon the individual's otherwise possessed
right of self-determination are questions which can only
be answered after comprehensive assessment of the
individual's present abilities and his capacity for
change and improvement. Failure to adequately protect
profoundly retarded residents has in the past often led
to serious injury and even death to the individual and
other residents. The typical consequences of such inad-
equacy are immediate, physical and therefore observable.
The consequences of overprotection or excessive restraint
upon self-determination (considered here as a documented
fact aside from the good or bad motives of those effecting
it) are typically less observable, more difficult to
isolate for discussion and analysis, but no less real or
harmful to the persons affected.
The difficulties encountered in determining types
and degrees of protection and autonomy for the individual
resident are innumerable and complex. There is, for example,
a tendency to assume that a diagnosis of 'retarded' is
properly retained for life. There is, however, no ade-
quate test for mental retardation the results of which
would lend themselves to simple determinations of type
or degree of protection and autonomy fcr the individual
tested. There is no adequate test for determining a per-
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son ' s potential at any age; and the giver of the test
has only the right to say strictly that at the time of
the test the person tested appears to be capable of doing
precisely those things that the test purported to test.
IQ tests test only specific points in time and only
specific areas
,
skills and abilities. Rules or decisions
founded on projections from such tests suffer from the
deficiencies possessed by the tests themselves in that
the test results speak only of the test subject's skills
and abilities at an earlier time. Institutional rules,
decisions and programs do operate (and have historically
operated) on the assumption that once a person tests as
retarded to any degree, then that classification is a proper
foundation and basis for all further rules, decisions and
programs for him thereafter. The assumption is evident
in the lack of ongoing administrative analysis of the
resident's actual skills and abilities (intellectual,
emotional, physical or social) and a further lack of
adequate habilitative programs aimed at maximizing the
resident's individual potential in those areas.
An individual once so classified and subsequently
institutionalized historically shows more and more the
characteristics of the retarded due principally to depri-
vations in intellectual
,
emotional, physical and social
areas
.
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A person who has been diagnosed as retarded through
testing procedures aimed primariliy at intelligence
measurement is typically classified as retarded in all
other areas as well - emotionally, physically and socially.
Intel lectural development is not highly correlated with
emotional, physical or social development; and yet for
purposes of nearly all administrative decision making
the intelligence criterion is usually determinative.
At least four variables contribute to the inadequacy
of intelligence measurement in standardized tests; the
person being tested, the person giving the test, and
location and environment of the test occasion, and the
test itself. For example, test questions are read to
subjects in different ways and in different accents by
different people; inflection, tone, speed and innumerable
other speech factors might well affect the test giver's
ability to adequately communicate the question; or the
test giver might present a threatening appearance to the
subject for reasons long lost in the subject's background.
The test subject (or for that matter the test giver) might
not be feeling physically well on the test occasion, or
might temporarily be distracted from the matter of the
question by the prospect, for example, of later in the day
going to a movie, on a trip, or the like. The immediate
environment of the test might give rise to test-invalidating
impact on the subject, for reasons, perhaps, that the
test was given in a room in which the subject suffered
a severe embarrassment or other distressing episode, or
the like. And the test itself, measuring only intelli-
gence, does not address the other components of the
en^ re Pe^son that have a direct relationship on the
ability to function in society. Mental retardation has
traditionally been viewed as the equivalent of intelli-
gence retardation: but intelligence is simply not the only
component of the human mind or person.
Moreover, the ongoing effectiveness of habilitative
programs (to the extent that the test subject partici-
pates therein)
,
growth spurts, and innumerable other factor
make necessary frequent reassessment of the resident's
retardation, without which no intelligent planning can
be had regarding the appropriate type and degree of pro-
tection or autonomy to be prescribed for the individual
concerned
.
It must further be observed that there exists a basic
incompatibility between human development and excessive
institutional protectiveness. Such excess denies a
person a right as a human being to ' self-actualize
,
' to
use Maslow's expression. The deprivation of a normally
stimulating social environment unquestionably has a retard-
ing effect on human development. Social and emotional
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growth takes place through integration with peer groups,
family groups, and groups of countless other social var-
ieties. The institutional resident has historically been
deprived of the opportunities for such integration,
deeping (or causing) retardation in the specific area of
deprivation. The transition, for example, from parallel
play to cooperative play is inhibited by the large numbers
of persons who (typically for convenience of supervision
by limited staff) are herded together for long periods
of time in what is neutrally termed 'the day hall.'
As Maslow explains regarding the hierarchy of needs, there
must be at least partial fulfilment at one level prior to
any possibility of advancement to the next level. A
person of relatively low 'mental age' (however correlated
or uncorrelated with chronological age) will simply not
realize his potential in the excessive-restraint environ-
ment of the day hall.
Human development has been fruitfully analogized to
block building; certain more complex skills and abilities
must be sequenced to follow previously mastered skills
and abilities. Without prior achievement of the basics
there can be no significant development. Moreover with
the passage of time during which no progression from one
level of development to another takes place, the individual
tends to varying degrees to lose the ability itself to
develop at all.
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The appearance of being retarded seems to be the
all too prominent but tacitly operative criterion of
retardation for most persons (including many professionals)
that come in contact with institutional residents. Having
concluded in advance to a theory which establishes a
correlation between retardation and appearances, subse-
quent observation ceases being scientifically objective
and becomes, to the detriment of the observed, theory
laden and defective. The results are usually inaccurate
and always too imprecise to be fruitful in dealing con-
structively with the retarded.
In times past deaf children have often been viewed
as being retarded; performance deficiencies directly
attributable to an inability to hear, uncritically accepted
as controlling evidence of retardation, might well have
been eliminable through an adequate analysis of the indiv-
idual and the appropriate affirmative action adapted to
his remaining senses.
Recourse to appearances as the operative criterion
of mental retardation gives us little to criticize but
its improbable generality. But when particular appearances
are cited then our criticism becomes more promising. For
example, in the area of speech development, it can clearly
be said that our society so highly regards the ability to
communicate through speech that an inability to do so creates
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a practical presumption of mental retardation; and at
very least, that inability converts directly into lower
scores in intelligence testing where the verbal component
of the testing procedures is significant. The non-devel-
opment or under-develcpment of speech is compatible with
many forms of mental retardation; but it is also compatible
with cerebral palsy and other physical conditions which
typically coexist with normal intelligence. In the area of
motor development, a person born with a spinal bifida (a
knotting and breaking of the nerves of the spinal cord)
may be observed as having the same appearances as a
severely to moderately retarded child. A number of now
retarded persons have endured, to their detriment, such
a misdiagnosis, and in consequence been rendered socially
and emotionally retarded by the imposed institutional
environment. While it is speculative what their original
potential might have been at normal functioning, it is not
speculative to say that whatever their potential might
have been originally, its development was seriously and
even permanently retarded. Such persons, as adults, have
become foreicrners in their own land because as children
they were diagnosed as retarded and placed in an institu-
tion lacking in opportunities to integrate socially,
emotionally, intellectually, and physically into the social
mainstream
.
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While it is true to say that many persons in the
intellectually normal range have been institutionalized as
retarded,
' after being judged so on the basis of emotional,
social, physical or verbal deficiency, it is conversely
the case that many q\iite retarded persons have achieved
*iui.t.e normal social, emotional or verbal characteristics
and are often taken to be not retarded.
In one actual case the same standardized test was
given to two individual residents, both girls of approx-
imately the same chronological age. Subject A was
socially adept, could relate to adults and peer groups in
socially acceptable fashion, and was generally accomplished
verbally. She appeared alert, happy and physically average
for her age. She was achieving in a classroom for the
retarded at a rate superior to others in the same class,
in all areas. She seemed in every way as completely self-
supportive as any individual of her age. The test, how-
ever, showed her to be retarded with an IQ of 72. Subject
B acted immature for her age in interacting with both adults
and her peers. She appeared dull, functioned at a lower
level verbally than others of her age and showed little
reaction to her surroundings. She did not progress as
well as others in her classroom, in all areas. She demon-
strated a need for more supervision in decision making activ-
ities. The test showed her to be retarded with an IQ of 72.
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Going back to the earlier discussed prohibition of
local store visits, such an administrative rule would
clearly be more appropriate for Subject B than for Sub-
ject A t for whom the restriction of autonomy in such
matters would achieve only the further retarding of
ability and potential at normal social intercourse.
What the test results should have said to the adminis-
trators is that intelligence test results do no lend them-
selves to a direct determination of appropriate degrees
or types of autonomy or restraint; instead, a rule
of convenience was framed which was geared to the lowest
common denominator. Instead of programs of habilitation
aimed at bringing Subject B up to her suggested potential
for normal social functioning, programs of restraint and
excessive protectiveness were established which had the
effect of bringing Subject A to a lower level of social
achievement than her suggested potential.
Compounding the administrative sins of non-diagnosis
and mis-diagnosis and failure to establish habilitative
programs, currently the state administrators feel that
the mistakes of years can be absolved in days through
virtually immediate discharge of the non-habilitatea
resident. However unequipped and unprepared to cope with
such commonplace demands as are encountered in shopping,
renting, travelling, and so on, they are sent off with the
dubious blessing of the state to seek their fortune in a
world with which they have been programatically and wrong-
fully deprived of contact. Society usually expects its
young adults to encounter some difficulty in the task
of integrating auonomously into adult society, even with
the obvious benefits of its being a gradual process, and
a process engaged in within the comfortable context of
normal family environments. The state, on the other
hand, deals with the discharged resident as if he or she
should know the behavior appropriate for all conventional
social situations, and furthermore to be proficient in it.
Marginally retarded persons can often do ijiany of
the things the ability to do which in the aggregate cus-
tomarily define the fully competent person. VJhat concerns
us at this point in the discussion is the substance and
the implementation of the state 'rules' to the extent (as
indicated earlier in the context of the equal protection
clause) that they can affect the individual in his life,
liberty, property and pursuit of happiness. The equal pro-
tection clause requires that the substance and the imple-
mentation of the rules be based on 'proper and justifiable
distinctions, considering the purpose of the law.'
The institutional rule, for example, prohibiting the
resident from freely visiting local stores is incompatible
with the mandate of the equal protection clause which pro-
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scribes rules which operate on persons without regard to
their relavent. differences (in this example in their
varying abilities in meeting the demands of store visits)
.
The equal protection clause prohibits the state from
affecting the lives of persons in the same class (in this
example the appropriate class being 'all those capable
of negotiating store visits, or at least with the poten-
tial of having that capability') in significantly different
ways. An institutional rule prohibiting all residents
from making store visits, while having an appropriate
effect upon a profoundly retarded person, nevertheless
when applied to a borderline retarded (or to a retarded of
any other degree who in fact possesses the ability in
question) it has the effect of depriving him of developing
or improving that ability to a point more nearly that
possessed by the fully competent person.
Protective functions exercised by institutional
administrators are justified only when there is protective
need on the part of the proposed object of those functions.
But many of the protective functions historically
exercised by institutional administrators have been aimed
at achieving administrative convenience and have been
uncorrelated with those protective needs.
Therefore those protective functions that are so un-
correlated are unjustifiable.
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It can be said of store visits that they are complex
social tasks requiring certain mixed minimum abilities,
some of which are physical (to walk distances, to see and
hear traffic and other people, etc.)
,
some verbal or social
(to relate to and to communicate with storekeepers, etc.),
some intellectual (to select store items, to order, read
^^kcls, count change)
,
and some emotional or maturational
(to perform the task without being sidetracked into other
pursuits, or without being disoriented as to the hazards
encountered in any contact with a relatively fast moving
social setting) . The rule of prohibition effectively
denies equal protections of the laws to those clearly
having the ability to perform such tasks and also to
those who have the potential of doing so, who through
suitable habilitative programs and an affirmative action
by administrators could achieve that ability. Rules
which have the effect of depriving the resident of devel-
opmental opportunities are violative of the equal pro-
tection clause.
To the challenge that the matter of store visits is
not in itself significant enough to warrant the imposition
constitutional sanctions, it must be indicated that this
has been selected as merely one example from a list of
frightening proportions. The impact of one such restriction
on self-determination might well be minimal; but the impact
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of the aggregate of institutional restraints and restrictions
touches seriously upon the life, liberty, property and
pursuit of happiness of the residents, unquestionably
reaching issuable proportions.
Institutional procedures and rules that fail to take
into account the complex nature of individual abilities
and the complex structure of human endeavors, and which
as a consequence retard residents from finding and exer-
cising their individual areas of competence, are unjust
and unconstitutional. Having chosen, by law, to operate
within the field of mental retardation and to administer
facilities for the care and treatment of the mentally
retarded, the state has therein chosen to exercise state
power over a class of persons defined only, by that law,
as being below a given level of intelligence. The manner
in which the state has exercised that power has been shown
in this paper to have been violative of a theory of justice
and violative of the U. S. Constitution.
The current outlines of change in the area of state
mental health administration have not adequately incor-
porated anything like the theoretical framework treated at
length above, but appear to be taking the form of a con-
vulsive restaffing of departmental and institutional per-
sonnel with the hope of filling positions with more
enlightened persons. This approach strikes at symptoms.
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not causes.
It must first be established and understood within
what conceptual framework the care and treatment of the
mentally retarded are to be pursued, and then that frame-
work must be buttressed by appropriate and effective
guarantees for implementation. A right granted without
its being coupled to an administrative or leqal but
available remedy for its infringement is empty and a
right in name only. An office legislatively created and
charged with the duty of overseeing the performance of
administrative activities and with measuring those acti-
vities against a standard of law and justice comes nearer
than any proposed alternative to providing such a guarantee.
Being independently answerable to the legislature alone, such
an office bypasses that departmental roadblock which has
in the past insulated its members from meritorious
challenges to the justness of their activities.
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APPENDIX A :
House Bill No. 2690
By Mr. Flaherty of Cambridge, petition of Charles F.
Flaherty, Jr., and another for legislation to establish
a division of mental health legal assistance under the
Massachusetts Defenders Committee. The Judiciary.
"The Commonwealth of Massachusetts: In the Year One
Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy-Two.
"An Act Establishing a Division of Mental Health Leaal
Assistance Under the' Massachusetts Defenders Committee-
.
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
in General Court assembled, and by the authority of the
same, as follows:
"Chapter 221 of the General Laws is hereby amended by
inserting after section 34D, the following new section: -
"Section 34E. In addition to the functions of the Massa-
chusetts defenders committee under section thirty-four D
of chapter two hundred twenty-one, said committee shall
establish and maintain a division of mental health legal
assistance. The committee shall appoint as director of said
division a member of the Massachusetts bar who shall serve
under and be directly responsible to the committee and
who shall, subject to the approval of the committee,
appoint and may remove mental health legal advisers, who
shall also be members of the Massachusetts bar. A mental
health legal adviser shall perform all duties assigned
under the appropriate provisions of chapter one hundred
twenty-three and such other duties as may be assigned
from time to time by the director. A mental health legal
adviser shall assist and advise patients and residents
at the Bridgewater State Hospital and patients under
court order at other public and private facilities concern-
ing their legal rights as provided under this chapter and
shall advise and arrange for appropriate legal represen-
tation of such party where otherwise necessary. A mental
health legal adviser may consent to represent a patient in
court proceedings if requested to so act by the patient
and after a finding by the court that such patient is
indigent. A mental health legal adviser may examine all
necessary patients' records, records of such facilities and
records of the department of mental health and may make
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such other inquiries as may be necessary to carry out hisduties hereunder. Except where disclosure is for the wel-
fare or benefit of the patient, information so obtained
shall be confidential and not disclosed to others than
the members of the Massachusetts defenders committee
appointed under section thirty-four D of chapter two
hundred twenty-one and to the director of said division
of mental health legal assistance and members of the staff
of the division. Said committee shall adopt such rules
and regulations as may be necessary for the care of its
affairs hereunder and may from time to time amend or
revise the same without further approval; provided,
however
,
that in the adoption of such rules and regulations
,
said committee in instances deemed appropriate by it, may
consult with the department of mental health, the department
of correction and such other public or private institutions
and personnel thereof, as may be of assistance to the
effectuation of the purposes hereof. Said director shall,
subject to the approval of said committee, appoint such
professional or non-professional aides, clerical and other
assistants as may be necessary to carry out the duties
of the committee hereunder and said committee shall provide
suitable accomodations throughout the commonwealth. The
director and other employees appointed hereunder shall not
be subject to the provisions of chapter thirty-one. Said
committee for the purposes hereof, may accept gifts, grants
or contributions from any source whether public or private
and may expend the same.
"Upon petition of a patient or resident in mental health
and retardation facilities of the mental health department,
or a patient at the Bridgewater State Hospital, or a patient
under court order at other public and private faailities,
or the legal guardian or next of kin of said patient, the
court to which such petition is addressed, may appoint a
member of the Massachusetts bar to represent said patient
and to advise said patient in his legal rights."
House Bill No. 2690 was not enacted into law; however,
on October 9, 1973, Chapter 893 of the Laws of 1973 was
approved, providing legal assistance to the indigent men-
tally ill. Notwithstanding its failure to meet all the
criticisms raised in this paper, Chapter 89 3 goes a long
way toward remedying the deficiencies of exisiting law
relating to retarded citizens. Chapter 893 is reprinted
as Appendix B.
APPENDIX B:
Chapter 893 - Lav/s of 1973
An Act providing for legal assistance to the indigent
mentally ill.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
in General Court assembled, and by the authority of the
same, as follows:
Chapter 221 of the General Laws is hereby amended by
inserting after section 34D the following section:
"Section 34E. The justices of the supreme judicial court
shall appoint a mental health leaal advisors committee
consisting of fourteen attorneys, four of whom shall hold
office for a term of four years, four for a term of three
years, three for a term of two years and three for a term
of one year. Upon completion of each such term of a member,
his successor shall be appointed for a term of four years.
The unexpired portion of any term which becomes vacant
shall be filled by the justices of the supreme judicial
court. Members of said committee may be removed by the
justices of the supreme judicial court. No member of
the committee shall receive any compensation for his services,
but each member shall be reimbursed for actual traveling
expenses incurred by him in attending the committee meetings.
The membership of the committee shall contain a practicing^
attorney or attorneys from each of the mental health regions
of the Commonwealth. The committee shall annually appoint
and may at any time remove an executive director who
shall be compensated from funds available therefor.
"Any practicing member of the bar of the commonwealth who
wishes to serve as a mental health legal advisor shall sub-
mit his name, office address and telephone number to the
committee, which shall compile a list of all such names
submitted, dividing the names into groups of lawyers
practicing within each of the mental health regions of
the commonwealth. Said list shall be updated quarterly.
Said list of mental health legal advisors shall be circu-
lated by the committee to the district courts and muni-
cipal courts of the commonwealth and to the department
of mental health. The committee shall annually establish
and approve a fee schedule for such services as shall be
performed by the mental health legal advisors and said
mental health legal advisors shall upon certificate of
the judge appointing him be compensated in accordance
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therewith for services performed for an indigent patient.
It shall be the duty of the committee to develop a pro-
gram of volunteer leaal assistance. Such program shall
utilize the participation of attorneys, professional
and nonprofessional aides and all other groups who offer
their services on a voluntary basis, to assist and advise
indigent patients and residents in Bridgewater state
hospital and all other mental health and retardation
facilities of the commonwealth concerning their legal
rights. Said volunteers may, subject to the approval
of the committee, interview and examine all pertinent
records of any such patient or resident. In addition,
the committee shall appoint such clerical or other non-
professional staff assistants as may be necessary to carry
out the duties of the committee.
"It shall be the duty of the committee to conduct a con-
tinuing program of information with regard to the legal
rights of patients and residents at all mental health and
retardation facilities in the commonwealth, which infor-
mation shall be circulated to said patients and residents
and their relatives
,
to the employees of the department
of mental health, the members of the bar of the common-
wealth and to anyone requesting such information. In
addition, such information shall be made available to the
public at large.
"Upon petition of an indigent patient or resident in
Bridgewater state hospital or any other mental health or
retardation facility, private or public, or the legal
guardian or a relative or a friend of such patient or
resident, to any district or municipal court of the common-
wealth, such court shall appoint from the list circulated
of mental health legal advisors, a lawyer, practicing in
the same or an adjoining mental health region as that in
which the court is situated, to advise such patient of
his legal rights and to represent such patient.
"A mental health legal advisor so appointed may examine all
records pertaining to such patient or resident, including
the records of the department of mental health and the
department of correction or any other agency of the govern-
ment of the commonwealth or any other institution operated
by the commonwealth or any political subdivision thereof
or any hospital situated in the commonwealth. In addition,
such advisor may make all necessary inquiries as he deems
proper for the carrying out of his duties.
"A mental health legal advisor shall be compensated for
legal services performed for an indigent patient by the
mental health legal advisor's committee in accordance
with the fee schedule established by the mental health
legal advisors committee as provided for herein.
"The committee shall be eligible for federal funds and may
accept gifts, grants or contributions from any source
and may expend the same, for the purpose of compensating
said mental health legal advisors. - Approved October 9,
1973. "
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APPENDIX C :
M.G.L.A. Chapter 19
,
Section 16
"There shall be a mental health advisory council consisting
of thirty persons to be appointed by the governor, of whom
at least half shall be members of community mental health
and retardation area boards, and of the remaining half
at least seven shall be appointed to represent one of the
following professions and groups: - state level medical,
psychological, nursing, educational, social work, occu-
pational therapy, or bar associations, state level associa-
tions for mental health and for mental retardation, indus-
trial and labor groups and the clergy. Upon the expir-
ation of the term of office of any member, his successor
shall be appointed for a term of three years. No member
shall be appointed to serve more than two consecutive three-
year terms. The council shall elect annually a chairman.
Members of said council shall serve without compensation,
but each member shall be reimbursed by the commonwealth
for all expenses incurred in the performance of his official
duties
.
"Said advisory council shall have the following duties; -
(a) It shall advise the commissioner on policy, program
development, and priorities of need in the commonwealth
for comprehensive programs in mental health and retardation;
(b) It shall participate with the department in holding
a regular series of public hearings throughout the common-
wealth to obtain the views of the area boards and other
citizens concerning the programs of the department and
the needs of the people in mental health and retardation
services
;
(c) It shall review the annual plans and the proposed
annual budget of the department, and shall make recommen -
dations to the commissioner in regard thereto;
731 It shall hold at least three meetings per year and shall
convene special meetings at the call of the chairman or the
council, a majority of the council, or the commissioner. -
Added St. 1966, Ex. Sess. c. 735, Sec. 1." (emphasis added)
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APPENDIX C ;
Portions of M.G.L.A. Chapter 19, Section 23
The area board shall have the following duties and powers:
(a) to act as the representative of . . .
(b) to advise
. . .
(c) to advise . . .
(d) to review and approve
. . .
(e) to review arrangements and contracts
. . .
(f) to consult
. . ,
(g) to communicate . . .
(h) to receive and administer any gift or bequest
. . .
(i) to receive funds
. . .
(j) to hold regular meeting . . .
(k) to elect . . .
Added St. 1966, Ex. Sess., c. 735, Sec. IV
It is interesting to note that advantage was taken of the
language appearing in subsection (a) above which authorizes
the area board to "act as the representative of the citizens
of the area;" when the Franklin County area board joined
the class action litigation (Ricci vs. Greenblatt) as an
amicus curiae, in its capacity to represent certain of the
retarded citizens in its area. But this is a very awkward
and unreliable way of achieving the protection of constitu-
tional rights of retarded citizens. Their participation in
the suit, however, had symbolic value and thereby aided in
achieving the results reached in that case.
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APPENDIX D :
M.G.L.A. Chapter 19, Section 21
"In each area established under section eighteen there shall
be a community mental health and retardation area board,
hereinafter called the area board, which shall be an agency
of the commonwealth
,
and shall serve in the department
. The
area board shal 1 consist of twenty-one members
,
who shall
be appointed by the commissioner. Two thirds of the members
shall live within the area for which they are appointed,
and the remaining members shall either live or work
within said area. Four members of said board shall be
selected from the mental health associations within
the area; and four members shall be selected from the
associations for the mentally retarded within the area.
The commissioner shall include at least one member from
each city and if practicable each town in the area, and
shall seek to provide proper geographical representation
in the membership of the board.
"Two thirds of such members shall be persons other than
employees of the commonwealth. No member shall be an
employee of the department.
"Upon the expiration of the term of any member of the area
board, his successor shall be appointed, in like manner,
for a term of three years. In the event of a vacancy,
the commissioner may, in like manner, appoint a member
who shall serve for the remainder of the unexpired term.
Members of the board shall serve without compensation, and
shall be sworn to the faithful performance of their duties.
The area board shall suggest for consideration by the com-
missioner one or more names for each such expiring term
or vacancy. No member shall be appointed for more than
two consecutive three-year terms. - Added St. 1966, Ex.
Sess., c. 735, Sec. 1." (emphasis added)
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